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Illinois Tool Works:  
Allocating the Burden of Proving Market Power 
in Patent Tying Cases 
By Dennis J. Abdelnour* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Intellectual property law and modern antitrust law have always been uneasy 
neighbors.  Patents and copyrights have traditionally been thought of as conferring on 
their owner a legal monopoly granted in order to promote innovation.1  These “legal 
monopolies,” it was assumed, were at odds with the goal of antitrust law: to promote 
competition.2  More recently, however, commentators have recognized that patent and 
antitrust doctrines are not inherently in conflict, but rather “are actually complementary, 
as both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry, and competition.”3   
¶2  The misunderstood economic relationship between intellectual property and 
antitrust is particularly profound in the law of tying.4  Recently, however, the Supreme 
Court stepped in to clarify the law regarding patent tying arrangements in Illinois Tool 
Works v. Independent Ink.5  The Court held that in a patent tying suit, a plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant has market power in the tying product, and that the plaintiff can 
no longer rely on a presumption that a patent confers market power over the tying 
product.6   
¶3  The demise of the presumption came as no surprise.7  Scholars have long 
recognized that the vast majority of patents confer little to no market power on their 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Northwestern University School of Law.  B.S., Mechanical Engineering, University 
of Notre Dame, 2001. 
1 See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 247-48 
(1994) (arguing that the tendency to refer to patents not as property rights, but rather as monopolies, has led 
to unsound decisions by the Supreme Court). 
2 Id. at 270. 
3 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND 
PATENT LAW AND POLICY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrptsummary.pdf (quoting Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 
897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
4 See Dam, supra note 1, at 268-69; see also Charles F. Rule, Patent-Antitrust Policy: Looking Back and 
Ahead, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 729 (1991) (“grudging tolerance of patent . . . protection in general has been 
replaced by an unabashed admiration for the property rights principles embodied in intellectual property . . . 
and an enthusiastic embrace . . . that the patent laws and antitrust laws both serve the same end”). 
5 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006). 
6 Id. at 1293. 
7 See, e.g., Kevin D. McDonald, Moving Forward While Facing Backward: Illinois Tool Rejects the 
Presumption of Market Power in Patent Tying Cases, 20-SUM ANTITRUST 33 (2006). 
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owners.8  The decision is rightly applauded as a victory for intellectual property owners, 
though its magnitude is yet uncertain.  As I will show, Illinois Tool merely shifted the 
burden of proving market power from the defendant to the plaintiff in a patent tying case.  
And plaintiffs challenging the legality of a patent tying arrangement will still have at their 
disposal a number of the arguments set forth in Illinois Tool urging the court to consider 
that in a small number of cases, patents do confer market power. 
¶4  Part II of this note discusses the lower court decisions and the basis of 
disagreement between the Federal Circuit and the District Court.9  Part III analyzes the 
Supreme Court’s Illinois Tool opinion.  Part IV presents an argument that, even though 
the Court has dismissed the presumption, the existence of a patent covering a product 
used in a tying arrangement is a significant evidentiary fact that may be extremely useful 
in setting out an affirmative showing of market power.  This note concludes with a 
summary of the arguments presented in Part V.   
II. LOWER COURT DISAGREEMENT: ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS, INC. V. INDEPENDENT INK, 
INC. 
A. The Facts 
¶5 Trident, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Illinois Tool Works, Inc., manufactures 
and distributes patented ink jet printheads to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs).10  
The OEMs manufacture printers, incorporating Trident’s printhead technology, that print 
bar codes on corrugated materials and kraft paper.11  The patented printhead technology 
allows a user to print bar codes or logos “directly onto corrugated shipping containers and 
cases, usually on-line, at the time of packaging.”12  Trident owns a patent on both the 
piezoelectric impulse ink jet printhead and on an ink container used in combination with 
the printhead.13  In addition, Trident manufactures and sells unpatented ink for use with 
its patented printheads.14   
¶6 Trident licenses its patented printhead technology to the OEMs.  The standard form 
licensing agreement requires “OEMs to purchase their ink for Trident-based systems 
exclusively from Trident” in order to use Trident’s patented printhead technology.15  The 
license agreement, by its very terms, is concededly an explicit tying arrangement.16  The 
question of whether the conditioning of the sale of the patented printhead technology (the 
tying product) on the sale of the unpatented ink (the tied product) is an explicit tying 
 
8 Ill. Tool, 126 S. Ct. at 1292 (“[T]he vast majority of academic literature recognizes that a patent does not 
necessarily confer market power.”). 
9 Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 1281 
(2006).   
10 Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
11 Id. 
12 TRIDENT Industrial Inkjet, Case or Outer Carton Coding, http://www.trident-
itw.com/Catg2.asp?Cat1ID=1202&Cat2ID=302 (last visited Feb. 20, 2007). 
13 Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1344.  See also U.S. Patent No. 5,343,226 (filed Sept. 28, 1990). 
14 Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1344.   
15 Id. at 1345 (emphasis added). 
16 Id.  See also Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1158 (“Defendants concede that: 1) OEMs must purchase 
their ink from Trident; and 2) OEMs and end users may not re-fill Trident ink containers with any ink, as 
they are intended as single use containers.”). 
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arrangement was never in dispute.17  Rather, the case turned entirely on whether the 
patented technology conferred market power on Trident based solely on the fact that the 
tying product is patented.  Independent’s case rested solely on the rebuttable presumption 
of market power conferred on Trident by its patent.  Indeed, Independent never presented 
a “Rule of Reason” analysis of Trident’s market power – including relevant geographic 
market, relevant product market, and substitutability of the product. 
¶7 Independent Ink manufactures and supplies ink in direct competition with Trident.18  
Independent’s ink has the same chemical composition as that sold by Trident, and is 
readily usable in Trident’s printheads.19  Independent claims that the tying arrangements 
are a restraint on competition under the antitrust laws.20 
B. The District Court Opinion 
¶8  Independent Ink commenced litigation when it brought a declaratory judgment 
action on August 14, 1998 seeking a ruling that it was not infringing two of Trident’s 
patents.21  Trident counterclaimed with a patent infringement action against Independent 
Ink.22  Independent then amended its complaint to include the patent tying claim at issue 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,23 as well as a monopolization and an attempted 
monopolization claim under Section 224 of the Sherman Act.25  Both parties moved for 
summary judgment on the Section 1 claim, and Trident moved for summary judgment on 
the Section 2 claim.26  For purposes of this note, the focus is solely on the patent tying 
Section 1 claim.27     
 
17 Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1345.  Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1158. 
18 Id. 
19 Ill. Tool, 126 S. Ct. at 1285; Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1345. 
20 Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1159. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Section 1 of the Sherman Act reads: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every 
person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared 
to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by 
fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by 
imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  Independent did not allege that the patent tying arrangement violated the Clayton 
Act, Section 3, which also prohibits certain tying arrangements.  15 U.S.C. § 14 (2006).  See infra note 60. 
24 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
25 Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1159.   
26 Id. 
27 The District Court dismissed Independent’s Section 2 monopolization and attempted monopolization 
claims based on its failure to establish market power, and its failure to establish a “dangerous probability of 
success” of monopolizing the market.  Id. at 1177.  This is not inconsistent with the treatment of the 
Section 1 claim, since there is no analogous per se treatment in Section 2 jurisprudence.  See United States 
v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (“The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act 
has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful 
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of 
a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”).  The Federal Circuit affirmed the Section 2 
dismissal.  Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1353.  See also Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. 
Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177-78 (1965) (holding that a relevant market analysis was necessary under § 2 even 
though defendant possessed a patent on the product at issue). 
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¶9  The issue before the District Court regarding the Section 1 Sherman Act claim 
was whether a patent confers market power in the tying product market as a matter of 
law.28  Indeed, Independent appeared to stake its claim upon a per se theory of liability, 
since they “did not perform an antitrust analysis at all.”29  Independent presented no proof 
of relevant product market, geographic market or product substitutes.  It did not challenge 
the agreement as one whose anti-competitive reach is broader than its pro-competitive 
effect, although it is clear that tying arrangements can be held illegal under either a per se 
or Rule of Reason standard.30  This strategy was likely based on the expense and 
difficulty of bringing a full-blown Rule of Reason case, including costly expert witnesses 
and market analysis.  It does not come, however, without risk.31 
¶10  The Court began with the widely accepted definition of a tying arrangement as 
one that “exists when a seller refuses to sell one product, ‘the tying product,’ unless the 
buyer also purchases a second product, the ‘tied product.’”32  In order to establish a per se 
violation under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must show:  
1) two distinct products or services; 2) a sale or agreement to sell the tying 
product conditioned upon the purchase of the tied product; 3) market 
power in the relevant market for the tying product; and 4) the tied product 
involves a “not insubstantial” amount of interstate commerce.33 
¶11 Although Trident argued that Independent did not adequately address each element, 
the District Court narrowed its focus to market power, since both parties agreed that the 
market power element would be dispositive.34  Element 2 is satisfied by Trident’s 
standard form licensing agreement, which requires OEMs and their customers to 
purchase all their ink for the Trident printhead systems exclusively from Trident.35  
Element 4 is nearly always satisfied, since “a not insubstantial amount of interstate 
commerce” is measured in terms of absolute dollar amounts and need merely be more 
than de minimis.36  Element 1, the two distinct products requirement, was never 
substantially argued, though it is likely here that, given the independent demand for the 
 
28 Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1160. 
29 Id. 
30 See id. at n.7.  Tying is unique in this aspect such that if a claim does not pass muster under a per se 
standard, the court could still condemn the tie under a Rule of Reason theory.  See Jefferson Parish Hosp. 
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 
F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1992).  
31 See, e.g., Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985).  In Polk Bros., Judge 
Easterbrook held that a per se standard was inapplicable, and since the plaintiff, Forest City, offered no 
evidence of market power, their claim could not stand.  Id. at 191.  Quoting the language of the Court: 
“Forest City has litigated the antitrust issue as one in which it prevails under the per se rule or not at all.  
‘Not at all’ it must be.”  Id.   
32 Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1162 (quoting Christopher R. Leslie, Unilaterally Imposed Tying 
Arrangements and Antitrust’s Concerted Action Requirement, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1773, 1773 (1993)). 
33 Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1162.  Thus, tying law is unique under Section 1 jurisprudence, in that the 
per se standard doesn’t merely require proof of a “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy.”  Rather, the 
per se standard resembles more of a modified Rule of Reason inquiry. 
34 Id. at 1163 n.7. 
35 Id. at 1160. 
36 Id. at 1163 n.7. 
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ink used in the printheads, the ink would be considered a product separate and distinct 
from the printheads.37   
¶12  The District Court held that a patent alone is insufficient to confer market power 
for purposes of antitrust tying.38  Therefore, the court, given Independent’s failure to 
show market power or evidence from which market power could be inferred, dismissed 
Independent’s Section 1 claim.39  The court rested its conclusion on the contrary “weight 
of authority”:40  lower court authorities that cite the general proposition that a patent 
alone does not confer market power,41 the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission Antitrust Guidelines,42 and Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in 
Jefferson Parish.43  The District Court faulted Independent for failing to identify “a single 
tying case in which the court has granted [a] plaintiff summary judgment solely” because 
the defendant held a patent on the tying product.44  In a footnote, the Court dismissed the 
Supreme Court authority relied upon by Independent as “vintage.”45   
¶13  The artful crafting of the District Court’s opinion is characterized by footnote 9.  
There, the Court dismissed the language of the Jefferson Parish majority, which states 
that “[i]f the Government has granted the seller a patent or similar monopoly over a 
product, it is fair to presume that the inability to buy the product elsewhere gives the 
seller market power,” in favor of the language of Justice O’Connor’s Jefferson Parish 
concurrence: “[a] common misconception has been that a patent . . . suffice[s] to 
demonstrate market power . . . [because] a patent holder has no market power in any 
relevant sense if there are close substitutes for the patented product.”46  Because Justice 
O’Connor was joined by four Justices in that concurring opinion, and a year later, two 
additional Justices called for proof of market power in an order denying certiorari to a 
patent tying case,47 the District Court concluded that a majority of the Supreme Court 
justices would “reject the notion” that a patent confers market power for patent tying 
purposes.48   
¶14  After dispelling any doubt that the controlling Supreme Court authority, including 
the seminal tying cases International Salt, Loew’s, and Jefferson Parish, stood for the 
proposition that market power could be presumed when the tying product was patented, 
the court held that even if it drew the inference of market power based on Trident’s 
patent, the facts of the case effectively rebut the presumption.49  Various other systems 
for placing bar codes on consumer products are readily available as substitutes to 
 
37 Id.  
38 Id. at 1163. 
39 Id. at 1173. 
40 Id. at 1163. 
41 Id. at 1163-64. 
42 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, § 5.3, Tying Arrangements (1995), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf. 
43 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 37 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
44 Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1165. 
45 Id. at n.10. 
46 Id. at n.9. 
47 Data Gen. Corp. v. Digidyne Corp., 473 U.S. 908, 908 (1985) (order denying writ of certiorari) (White, 
J., dissenting). 
48 Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1165 n.9. 
49 Id. at 1166-67. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 7  
 
 370
Trident’s system.50  Moreover, two competitors, Markem and Xaar, had developed 
printheads for printing bar codes on kraft paper, indicating that barriers to entry in the 
market were low.51 
¶15 Thus, the court concluded that the patent tying arrangement did not violate Section 
1 of the Sherman Act, regardless of whether or not the court applied the “formalistic” 
legal presumption that a patent confers market power.  Ironically, the formalistic 
presumption that was too rigid to reflect market realities could still have been applied by 
the very court that dismissed it to reach the outcome that the court believed to actually 
reflect market reality.  In other words, the District Court made the rebuttable presumption 
of market power rule work to obtain the desired result.  This is no small point, because it 
reflects the distinction between the rebuttable presumption applied to patented ties, and 
per se rules applied in other contexts.  In other words, the crux of the issue was simply 
who had the burden of proving (or rebutting) market power: the plaintiff or the defendant. 
C. The Federal Circuit Opinion 
¶16  In an opinion by Judge Dyk, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit52 
reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on the Sherman Act § 1 claim.53  
In doing so, the Court held that a “rebuttable presumption of market power arises from 
the possession of a patent over a tying product.”54  The opinion itself is noteworthy in its 
diametric approach to applying the relevant precedent compared to the District Court 
opinion.  The Federal Circuit relied almost entirely on the Supreme Court precedent that 
the District Court dismissed as “vintage.”55  Moreover, the opinion rebuked the District 
Court’s approach for simply ignoring relevant Supreme Court precedent and instead 
relying on a concurring opinion, a dissent from a denial of certiorari, and academic 
criticisms to conclude that there is no presumption that patents confer market power.56  
The court found both the defendant’s arguments and the District Court’s opinion to be 
fundamentally flawed in that “they ignore the fact that it is the duty of a court of appeals 
to follow the precedents of the Supreme Court until the Court itself chooses to expressly 
overrule them.”57 
¶17  The only issues on appeal before the Federal Circuit were the Sherman Act 
section 1 and section 2 claims.58  All other claims were settled and dismissed with 
prejudice.59  The primary issue facing the Federal Circuit was whether patent tying is 
illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act, or whether the plaintiff must 
affirmatively prove market power for the tying product.60  In other words, the question 
 
50 Id. at 1167. 
51 Id. 
52 The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) because the 
complaint originally contained a claim for patent invalidity and non-infringement.  Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. 
Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005).   
53 Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1344. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1345. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1351. 
58 Id. at 1346. 
59 Id. at 1345-46. 
60 Id. at 1346.  Independent does not challenge Trident’s actions under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 
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was whether in a Section 1 tying case, market power can be presumed solely from the 
existence of a patent covering the tying product.61   
¶18  The opinion relied heavily on the “long history” of Supreme Court tying cases.62  
First, the court discussed the seminal tying case International Salt Co. v. United States.63  
In International Salt, the defendant leased its patented machines with the express 
requirement that the lessees purchase all salt consumed in the machines exclusively from 
the defendant.64  The Court recognized that International Salt’s patents conferred “a 
limited monopoly of the invention . . . [from which International Salt] derives a right to 
restrain others from making, vending or using the patented machines.”65  Thus, summary 
judgment against International Salt was appropriate since the tying arrangement 
constituted a “restraint of trade for which [International Salt’s] patents afford no 
immunity from the antitrust laws.”66  No market power analysis was necessary, since the 
“tendency of the arrangement to accomplishment of monopoly seems obvious.”67 
¶19  Next, the opinion turned to United States v. Loew’s, Inc.,68 where the principal 
that market power may be presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted 
was made explicit.69  Loew’s had refused to license feature films to televisions stations 
unless the stations accepted one or many other less desirable films.  Thus, the Loew’s 
court was faced with an explicit copyright tying arrangement.70  The Loew’s court 
established that it had no need to inquire into whether the distributors had market power, 
but rather that “[t]he requisite economic power is presumed when the tying product is 
patented or copyrighted.”71  The legal and economic distinctiveness of the copyrighted 
product precluded the court from engaging in a market power inquiry.72   
¶20 Finally the court turned to Jefferson Parish, the Supreme Court’s most recent 
pronouncement on the law of tying.73  In Jefferson Parish, Justice Stevens, writing for the 
majority, made clear that only when anticompetitive “forcing” is present in a tying 
arrangement is there an “unacceptable risk of stifling competition” and therefore a 
violation of the antitrust laws.74  When a tying arrangement forces a buyer to purchase a 
tied product that he would have rather bought elsewhere or not at all, “competition on the 
merits in the market for the tied item is [impermissibly] restrained.”75  And even though 
the tying arrangement in Jefferson Parish involved hospital patient’s use of a designated 
 
U.S.C. § 14 (2000), which outlaws tying arrangements.  See id. at n.4.   
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
64 Id. at 394. 
65 Id. at 395. 
66 Id. at 396. 
67 Id.   
68 371 U.S. 38 (1962). 
69 Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  It may be interesting to 
note that Judge Dyk served as a law clerk to Chief Justice Warren during the 1962-1963 term.  See U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Judicial Biographies, http://www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2007).  Loew’s was decided in November 1962.  Loew’s, 371 U.S. at 38. 
70 Loew’s, 371 U.S. at 40. 
71 Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Loew’s 371 U.S. at 45). 
72 Loew’s, 371 U.S. at 49. 
73 Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1347. 
74 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984).   
75 Id. 
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anesthesiology firm and not a patented product, the court noted that in cases where a 
product is patented, “it is fair to presume that the inability to buy the product elsewhere 
gives the seller market power.”76  In other words, an explicit patent tie presumably forces 
a buyer into buying a product from the patent holder that he would rather have bought 
elsewhere or not at all.  This impermissible forcing establishes a violation of the antitrust 
laws. 
¶21 These cases, the Federal Circuit concluded, “squarely establish” that patent ties “do 
not require an affirmative demonstration of market power.”77  The Court then dismissed 
Illinois Tool’s contentions that International Salt and Loew’s do not control as they are 
no longer good law.78  Illinois Tool made three arguments against the application of 
International Salt and Loew’s: (1) the Supreme Court’s subsequent opinion in Walker 
Process79 effectively overruled the patent tying line of cases;80 (2) Justice O’Connor’s 
concurring opinion in Jefferson Parish and Justice White’s dissent from a denial of 
certiorari81 (joined by Justice Blackmun) the following year imply that International Salt 
and Loew’s are no longer good law;82 and (3) the voluminous academic criticism of the 
presumption that patents confer market power have led some lower court’s to refuse to 
apply it, and should persuade the Federal Court not to apply it.83   
¶22 The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments.84  Illinois Tool’s contentions, taken 
individually or in concert with each other, were insufficient simply because the Supreme 
Court has never expressly overruled either International Salt or Loew’s.85  Thus, 
according to the Federal Circuit, International Salt and Loew’s establish that the 
presumption of market power arises when a tying product is patented, and that doctrine is 
still good law.  Judge Dyk concluded that the Federal Circuit is obliged to follow the 
directly controlling precedent, and that it is the Supreme Court’s “prerogative alone to 
overrule one of its precedents.”86  Whether the doctrine should be abandoned rests upon 
the judgment of Congress or the Supreme Court.87   
¶23 Finally, although no authority explicitly prescribes that the presumption of market 
power conferred by a patent is rebuttable, the Federal Circuit concluded in agreement 
with the District Court that the presumption is rebuttable.88  Based on the evidence 
presented by Illinois Tool to rebut the presumption, the Federal Circuit found that it was 
insufficient to rebut the presumption or to create a genuine issue of fact.89  The Federal 
Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case to the District 
 
76 Id. at 16.   
77 Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1348. 
78 Id. at 1349. 
79 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). 
80 Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1349. 
81 Data Gen. Corp. v. Digidyne Corp., 473 U.S. 908, 908 (1985). 
82 Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1350. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 1351. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1352. 
89 Id. 
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Court to give Illinois Tool an opportunity to supplement the record with evidence to rebut 
the presumption.90   
D.  Artfully Distinguishing Antitrust Precedent: Lower Court Approaches 
¶24 Antitrust law doctrine is based in large part on economic principles.  As economic 
theory evolves and economic principles underlying doctrines either lose vitality or are 
shown to be patently wrong, lower courts struggle to apply precedent that they 
understand to make no economic sense.  Professor McChesney identifies two instances 
where appellate courts dealt with the application of relevant doctrine the courts fully 
recognized were based on economically absurd principles.91  In Khan v. State Oil Co.,92 
Judge Posner formalistically applied the principle that vertical maximum-price fixes were 
per se illegal, while criticizing the doctrine as “unsound.”93  Contrast Posner’s style to 
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Polk Brothers, Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,94 
where the court simply refused to recognize the per se rule against horizontal territorial 
allocations.  Judge Easterbrook never even cited the controlling Supreme Court precedent 
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.95 
¶25 Professor McChesney notes that lower courts work around Supreme Court 
precedents “by artfully distinguishing them.”96  One of these “ploys” is done by finding 
controlling Supreme Court precedent to be “effectively overruled” and then treating the 
case in front of it “as if” it had been overruled.97  The appellate courts usually recognize 
that the binding precedent comes from older cases that today the Supreme Court would 
no longer follow.98  This application is exemplified by Judge Bork’s opinion in Rothery 
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines,99 which instead of applying the Topco per se rule 
to the horizontal territorial allocation, concluded that more recent Supreme Court 
decisions had “effectively overruled” Topco.  Judge Bork instead found the disputed 
contracts legal under a Rule of Reason analysis.100    
¶26 The difficulty lower courts face when applying legal doctrines based on unsound 
economic theory highlights the Federal Circuit’s fundamental disagreement with the 
District Court.  The District Court applied an “effectively overruled” analysis to 
International Salt and Loew’s.  It dismissed those cases in a footnote as “vintage,” 
presumably meaning that they were old.  Then, the District Court unabashedly relied on a 
conglomeration of academic criticisms, a concurring opinion, and a dissent from a denial 
of certiorari to find that the Supreme Court today would not apply the presumption of 
market power announced in Loew’s.   
 
90 Id. at 1352-53. 
91 See Fred S. McChesney, Talking ’Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition For and In The Field of 
Competition, 52 EMORY L. J. 1401, 1408-10 (2003). 
92 93 F.3d 1358 (7th Cir. 1996). 
93 McChesney, supra note 91, at 1409. 
94 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985). 
95 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
96 McChesney, supra note 91, at 1410. 
97 Id. at 1410-11. 
98 Id. at 1410. 
99 792 F.2d 210, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
100 Id. at 216. 
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¶27 The Federal Circuit, much like Judge Posner in Khan, concluded that Supreme 
Court precedent unambiguously established a presumption of market power in patent 
tying cases, and that it was the court’s duty to apply that presumption.  Though the 
opinion stopped short of criticizing the presumption, it reserved its skepticism: “the time 
may have come to abandon the doctrine, but it is up to the Congress or the Supreme 
Court to make this judgment.”101  The Federal Circuit refused to engage in an academic 
inquiry into the economic foundation underlying the presumption.  It refused to question 
the wisdom of the Supreme Court precedents that established the presumption.  It simply 
applied binding precedent as it is the duty of an appellate court to do so.102 
III. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION 
¶28  The Supreme Court in Illinois Tool unanimously held that a patent does not 
confer market power upon its owner, and that in all cases brought alleging illegal tying, 
the plaintiff must prove as part of its affirmative case that the defendant has market 
power in the tying product.103  Justice Stevens, writing for an 8-0 Court,104 vacated the 
Federal Circuit’s opinion and remanded the case to the District Court in order to give 
Independent Ink an opportunity to offer evidence defining a relevant product market and 
showing that Illinois Tool possesses market power within that market.105   
¶29  The opinion confirms that the Federal Circuit’s deference to existing Supreme 
Court authority was appropriate.  Not only did it explicitly concede that International Salt 
and Loew’s stood for the proposition that a patent did indeed give rise to a presumption of 
market power, but it also noted that Independent Ink “reasonably relied” on those 
opinions in moving for summary judgment absent any evidence defining a relevant 
market or showing that Illinois Tool possessed power within that market.106   
¶30  The Court’s recognition of a presumption of market power in its patent tying 
jurisprudence was noteworthy in rejecting the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that the 
presumption was rebuttable: “. . . nothing in our opinion suggested a rebuttable 
presumption of market power . . . .”107  That conclusion, which required a parsed reading 
of Jefferson Parish in light of International Salt and Loew’s, was just as likely as the 
Federal Circuit’s opposite conclusion that the presumption was rebuttable.  The 
difference in application of the presumption was enormous: an irrebuttable presumption 
of market power created a per se rule against patent ties; a rebuttable presumption of 
market power merely shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.  After concluding that 
the presumption was not rebuttable, the Court clearly could not affirm a per se rule.  An 
irrebuttable presumption was susceptible to sharp attack given the obvious and well-
recognized fact that most patents confer little or no market power on their owners.108   
 
101 Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
102 Id. 
103 Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1293 (2006). 
104 Justice Alito did not participate.  Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 1288.  
108 See id. at 1291 (“the vast majority of academic literature recognizes that a patent does not necessarily 
confer market power”). 
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¶31 The Court’s opinion next took an unusual turn.  In order to reach the conclusion it 
sought, the Court needed to overrule those decisions that it interpreted as standing for the 
presumption that patents confer market power: International Salt and Loew’s.  It also had 
to address the unambiguous language in Jefferson Parish Hospital v. Hyde that appeared 
to reaffirm the presumption.109  Yet the Court appeared uncomfortable directly overruling 
its prior opinions because they were based on erroneous and disproven economic theory.  
The opinion peculiarly relies neither on empirical evidence nor on economic theory, 
though the extensive scholarly authority on the issue admittedly informed the Court’s 
decision.110  Nor was the fact that the antitrust enforcement agencies had changed their 
position regarding patent tying arrangements dispositive.111  Instead, the Court turned to 
an analogous doctrine in patent law: the patent misuse doctrine. 
¶32  The Court built up a strawman to tear down: because the presumption that a 
patent confers market power was imported into antitrust law from the patent misuse 
doctrine, and given that Congress has since removed the presumption from the patent 
misuse laws, removal is similarly warranted in patent tying antitrust law.112  The 
importation of the patent misuse doctrine into antitrust tying jurisprudence occurred 
rather mysteriously in International Salt.113  The mystery lies in the fact that “the Court’s 
opinion [in International Salt] does not discuss market power or the patent misuse 
doctrine.”114  Rather, this importation of the patent misuse doctrine “can be traced to the 
Government’s brief in International Salt.”115  There, the Government urged the Court to 
consider the analogy between the facts of International Salt and an earlier patent misuse 
case, Morton Salt.116   The Government’s brief asked the Court to include patent tying 
arrangements in the category of per se violations of the Sherman Act, and the Court’s 
International Salt opinion clearly accepted the “Government’s invitation to import the 
presumption of market power in a patented product into [the Court’s] antitrust 
jurisprudence.”117   
¶33  These two preliminary findings by the Court – that the presumption was not 
rebuttable, and that the presumption was imported into tying law from the patent misuse 
doctrine – made the Court’s task of striking down the presumption both straightforward 
and inevitable.  The Court simply needed to examine the doctrine of patent misuse to 
undermine the presumption’s continuing validity.  There, the Court was able to document 
the history of the shift away from a presumption that a patent confers market power.118  
That history culminated in Congress’s most recent amendment to the Patent Code, which, 
when read fairly, eliminated completely the presumption in the patent misuse context.119  
 
109 See 466 U.S. 2, 16 (“If the Government has granted the seller a patent or similar monopoly over a 
product, it is fair to presume that the inability to buy the product elsewhere gives the seller market 
power.”). 
110 Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1285 (“Our review is informed by extensive scholarly comment and a change in 
position by the administrative agencies charged with enforcement of the antitrust laws.”).   
111 Id.  
112 Id. at 1288-91. 





118 Id. at 1290-91. 
119 Id. at 1290 (“Four years after our decision in Jefferson Parish . . . Congress amended the Patent Code to 
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To preserve the presumption in the antitrust context, therefore, when Congress clearly 
intended to destroy it in the patent misuse context would be anomalous.  Absent its 
foundation, the presumption’s demise was complete.   
¶34  The Court next dismissed Independent’s arguments that 1) the Court should adopt 
a rebuttable presumption that patents confer market power for purposes of antirust tying, 
and 2) the Court should recognize a narrower category of tying arrangements, so-called 
“requirements ties,” and apply a presumption of market power in those instances.120  The 
former argument recognizes that a large number of patents have little commercial 
significance, but those used to impose tying arrangements likely do exert significant 
market power.  The Court, however, had already gone out of its way to declare that the 
patent presumption was both valid and irrebuttable, creating a per se offense of patent 
tying.  Having already rejected that its precedents created a rebuttable presumption, the 
Court would be hard pressed to create a rebuttable presumption.   
¶35 Nor did the Court find any support for distinguishing requirements ties – tying the 
purchase of unpatented goods over a period of time (e.g. ink) to the purchase of a 
patented tying product (e.g. printheads) – from other tying arrangements.121  The problem 
with the argument, the Court found, was that although a requirements tie enabled a seller 
to engage in price discrimination – itself a proxy for significant market power – price 
discrimination was also consistent with a fully competitive market.122  Moreover, the 
Court found that no such distinction could be gleaned from precedent, since neither 
International Salt, Loew’s, or Jefferson Parish involved a requirements tie.123 
IV. PATENTS & MARKET POWER: PROVIDING AN EVIDENTIARY LINK 
¶36  Illinois Tool shifted the burden of proving market power back to the plaintiff in 
patent tying cases, thereby bringing into alignment patent tying litigation with all other 
tying litigation.  That’s all it did.  Now, instead of requiring the defendant to disprove 
market power, the plaintiff is required to show market power as part of its affirmative 
case.124  
¶37 Antitrust plaintiffs attacking a patent tying arrangement now must prove market 
power, including defining a relevant product and geographic market, and a showing that 
the plaintiff has market power within that market.  But the existence of a patent covering 
a tying product is not irrelevant.  Indeed, if a tying product is patented, the existence of a 
patent can still be used as evidence to bolster a showing of market power.  At oral 
argument, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the market power element of the per se tying 
offense “as a practical matter, this screen [market power] is really doing the heavy 
 
eliminate [the] presumption in the patent misuse context, 102 Stat. 4674.”) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) 
(2006)). 
120 Id. at 1291-92. 
121 Id. at 1292. 
122 Id. 
123 Id.  
124 The Court’s conclusion that in patent tying cases, the law previously had created an irrebuttable 
presumption of market power was never seriously considered by any of the lower courts or the parties 
themselves.  The Federal Circuit concluded and Independent Ink argued to the Supreme Court that a patent 
created a rebuttable presumption of market power.  Had the Supreme Court not granted certiorari, that is 
very likely what the state of the law would have been.   
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lifting.”  It is the element that requires “all the economic studies . . . discovery, the 
experts.  This is what costs a lot of money and shifts a lot of the litigation burden.”125 
¶38  Market power is a key element in antitrust litigation.  A party required to prove 
that an adversary has market power faces an expensive, uphill battle.  But the contours of 
that terrain are well known.  The party must establish a relevant market, including the 
product market and geographic market.  The party must show that substitutes for the 
defendant’s product are not readily available within an established geographic market 
area.  Plaintiffs in patent tying cases are now charged with this burden.  But for the 
reasons I will set out below, the fact that a patent covers the tying product is not wholly 
irrelevant after Illinois Tool.  Indeed, a plaintiff will be well served by determining the 
value of the patent in terms of its power to exclude.  A broad patent may help the plaintiff 
establish a narrow product market.    
¶39 In the proceeding sections I will attempt to show the following: First, that Illinois 
Tool was essentially about who bears the burden of proof, and not about the irrational 
application of a per se rule.  Second, patents involved in antitrust litigation and the 
subject of tying arrangements are especially likely to be among the small subset of 
inherently valuable patents – an important consideration relevant to showing market 
power.  And third, a patent tying arrangement that fosters price discrimination through 
the type of “metering” seen in Illinois Tool would not be entered into but for the 
possession of market power in the tying product.126  In other words, price discrimination 
itself is a proxy for market power.  
A. Illinois Tool was about who bears the burden of proof and not about irrational per se 
application 
¶40  The Federal Circuit interpreted the patent tying jurisprudence as requiring that a 
patent creates not an irrebuttable presumption of market power, but rather that once a 
plaintiff establishes a patent tying agreement, the burden to rebut the presumption shifts 
to the defendant.127  Thus, under that rule, the per se offense of patent tying hardly 
resembled a per se test at all.  Instead, it resembled a full blown rule of reason inquiry, 
with the caveat that the defendant was required to rebut market power.  Such a rule gave 
defendants significant opportunity to defeat meritless claims, gave courts significant 
opportunity to dismiss baseless per se allegations, and minimized the risk of fostering 
Type I judicial errors.  The Supreme Court, therefore, in abandoning the presumption and 
vacating the Federal Circuit’s decision, effectively shifted the burden of proof from the 
defendant and patent owner to the plaintiff.   
¶41  The rebuttable presumption did not suffer from the faults of traditional per se 
rules.  Courts have been increasingly cognizant of the harm that misguided application of 
antitrust jurisprudence can inflict.128  The error cost associated with a “wrong” decision 
will be greater when pro-competitive activity is outlawed than when anti-competitive 
 
125 Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2937 (2005) (No. 
04-1329), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/04-1329.pdf. 
126 See Brief of Professors Nalebuff et al. as Amici Curiae supporting respondents, Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. 
Indep. Ink, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2937 (2005) (No. 04-1329), 2005 WL 2427646. 
127 Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
128 McChesney, supra note 91, at 1411. 
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activity is not outlawed.129  These two types of errors are termed Type I error and Type II 
error respectively.  The theory is that a Type II error is self-correcting, since the market 
will eventually defeat the anti-competitive activity, but a Type I error is not.  Thus, an 
antitrust law that outlaws a pro-competitive activity, for example a mistaken case of 
predatory pricing, can only be corrected when the law is changed.130   
¶42 Per se rules have been much maligned for creating unnecessary Type I judicial 
error.131  But unlike other per se rules, the patent under a rebuttable presumption would 
have had the opportunity to rebut market power.  Moreover, it is the defendant who is in 
the best position to rebut a presumption of market power because it is the defendant who 
owns the patent at issue and possesses the best knowledge of the market conditions.  The 
patent owner, in other words is the efficient provider of information regarding market 
power.  The defendant, therefore, is the least cost provider of the information that the 
court deems relevant.  In many cases, it would be prohibitively costly for a plaintiff to 
bear the burden of proof in a market analysis.132   
¶43  The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the defendant should bear the 
burden of proof in patent tying cases.  There was no reason to distinguish why the 
defendant should bear the burden in patent tying cases as compared with non-patent tying 
cases, since the defendant is arguably the least cost provider of information in both 
instances.     
B. Patents involved in litigation and licensing agreements: distinguishing patents in 
general from valuable patents 
¶44  It is clear that the great majority of patents do not confer market power on their 
owners.133  However, this section will show that the mere fact that most patents do not 
confer market power is only circumferentially related to the question of whether the 
specific patents involved in antitrust litigation confer market power.  It is this more 
narrow inquiry that should be of paramount concern.  This argument, that the subset of 
patents involved in costly antitrust litigation is more likely than not to confer market 
power given their relative value, was rejected by the Supreme Court,134 but can still be 
 
129 Id. at 1411-1412. 
130 Id. at 1412-1413.  Predatory pricing is the practice of lowering prices below cost in an effort to destroy 
competition.  Once competitors are removed, a firm can reap a monopoly profit.  A theory of predatory 
pricing has been questioned as irrational and highly improbable.  See Matsushita Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).  A court commits a Type I error outlawing conduct on the ground of predatory 
pricing when a firm is lowering prices merely to be competitive.  The Court’s mistake leads to higher prices 
which harm consumers. 
131 This is essentially the position that Justice O’Connor takes in her concurring opinion in Jefferson 
Parish.  Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 32 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
132 Indeed, a court’s ruling that a case is to be decided under the Rule of Reason rather than on a per se 
basis is usually dispositive.  The plaintiff will either drop the claim or settle, since at that point he is 
charged with proving market power in a relevant product and geographic market.  It is well understood that 
such a showing can be prohibitively expensive.  Moreover, a ruling that a case is to be decided on a Rule of 
Reason basis also tends to show that a judge is sympathetic to the defendant’s pro-competitive justification 
for the allegedly illegal activity. 
133 Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 
53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1730 (2000). 
134 Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1291 (2006) (“Respondent recognizes that a 
large number of valid patents have little, if any, commercial significance, but submits that those that are 
used to impose tying arrangements on unwilling purchasers likely do exert significant market power.”). 
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instructive to the antitrust plaintiff who must now prove market power over a patented 
tying product.  Indeed, the following discussion may be useful to aid antitrust plaintiffs in 
identifying those relatively few patents that are so groundbreaking and valuable that their 
very existence may signal and serve as evidence that the seller of the patented product 
enjoys market power. 
¶45 Patent monopoly is no longer equated with the monopoly that is the focus of the 
antitrust laws.  Today, scholars and courts unequivocally acknowledge the distinction 
between a patent monopoly and a monopoly or market power in the antitrust sense.135  A 
patent should properly be understood as a property right.136  Indeed, a patent is not even 
an affirmative grant of rights, but rather a patent grants the owner the right to exclude 
others from making, using or selling the patented invention.137  And yet the earliest 
jurisprudence involving antitrust and intellectual property was flawed given this 
confusion between a patent monopoly as the term is conventionally used, and patent as a 
property right.138  This critical distinction informs the discussion of whether any patents 
can have significant value and reach to confer on their owners market power. 
¶46 A brief look at different patent strategies illustrates how many patents provide their 
owners little to nothing in terms of market power.  Patents, unlike copyrights or 
trademarks, must go through a costly and lengthy examination process before the U.S. 
Patent & Trademark office.139  A patent will issue only if it meets the statutory 
requirements of usefulness, novelty, and non-obviousness.140  Thus, patents that issue in 
well-developed technologies will inevitably contain very narrow claims defining the 
limited scope of the patent owner’s property.141   
¶47  Many other patents are obtained by firms pursuant to a “defensive patenting” 
strategy.142  The object is for the firm to claim an area of technology by preventing other 
firms from filing suit against them.143  And in industries where the major players have 
large patent portfolios, each firm is more concerned with number of patents than with the 
quality of patents.144  Firms in these industries commonly arrange royalty-free cross-
licensing deals among themselves.145  Here, patent acquisition serves as a bargaining 
chip, and increased patent volume serves to help leverage a firm’s industry position.146  It 
is apparent that patents obtained with these ends in mind can hardly be said to confer on 
their owner a type of monopoly in the sense that antitrust should be concerned with.   
¶48  Other firms, particularly start-ups and new entrants, obtain patents as a type of 
financing tool in order to signal to potential creditors that the firm is dedicated to 
 
135 See, e.g., Dam, supra note 1, at 247-48.   
136 See Dam, supra note 1. 
137 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006). 
138 See Dam, supra note 1; WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 374 (2003). 
139 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
140 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2006). 
141 Kitch, supra note 133, at 1729. 
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operating at the cutting edge.147  Or patents may simply be used to bolster a firm’s asset 
sheet.148  Finally, some patents are issued to applicants who simply “want[] a patent.”149   
¶49  The preceding examples merely illustrate what has long been recognized by 
economists and patent owners: that most patents do not confer market power.  But it is 
not the patents having narrow claims and a limited scope, patents obtained pursuant to a 
defensive strategy, or patents used merely as a bargaining chip or financing tool that will 
likely be the focus of a tying arrangement and involved in costly antitrust litigation.  
Moreover, the conclusion that most patents do not confer market power presupposes that 
some patents do confer market power.   
¶50 Edmund Kitch identifies as an “elementary but persistently repeated error[]” that 
intellectual property rights are assumed to confer an economic monopoly on their 
owner.150  Kitch explains why “patents that confer monopoly market power are rare.”151  
But even here, Kitch makes explicit that “to argue that the monopoly case is not the 
appropriate one to use…generally is not to argue that no intellectual property rights 
confer an economic monopoly.”152  Indeed, a small number of basic or “pioneer patents” 
embody truly novel innovations that either supersede a given field or create an entirely 
new field.153  These “pioneer patents” are recognized to confer on their owners market 
power.   
¶51 Kenneth Dam argues that “it is quite plausible…that in the great bulk of instances 
[patents confer] no significant market power.”154  And rather than conceiving of patents 
as granting a monopoly, it is more useful to understand patents that achieve commercial 
success as permitting the owner to enjoy an economic rent.155  The patent owner can 
reduce its production costs below that of its competitors.  Certain firms, therefore, are 
able to achieve a “dominant firm” position, which allows the dominant firm to set prices 
at a monopoly level position with respect to the output that the fringe firms cannot 
produce.156  Thus, Dam recognizes the utility of restricting the concept of monopoly “to 
circumstances…where patent licenses are used, as in certain classic antitrust cases, as a 
device for implementing anticompetitive agreements.”157   
¶52 The question, therefore, is not whether any, all, most, or some patents confer 
market power.  The question is which patents confer market power.  And, more 
particularly, the question becomes whether the patents that tend to be the subject of tying 
arrangements and are involved in antitrust litigation fall within this narrow category of 
patents that do confer market power.  As an aid to answering this question, I turn to 
empirical studies of patents. 
 
147 Id. at 1505. 
148 Id.  
149 Id. at 1506.  See, e.g., Method of Swinging on a Swing, U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000). 
150 Kitch, supra note 133, at 1729. 
151 Id. at 1730. 
152 Id. at 1731 (emphasis added). 
153 Id. 
154 Dam, supra note 1, at 250. 
155 Id. 
156 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 138, at 297-300. 
157 Dam, supra note 1, at 251. 
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¶53 Mark Lemley estimates that 95% of all patents are never licensed or litigated.158  
Only an estimated 1.5% of all patents are ever the subject of litigation, and after 
settlements, less than 0.2% of all patents actually go to court.159  These figures suggest 
what the previous examples of patent strategies show: that the great majority of patents 
do not confer market power.  More striking are the figures representing patents that are 
allowed to lapse at the time that relatively modest maintenance fees are due.  Lemley’s 
study indicates that after 5 years, nearly 18% of patent owners allow their patents to 
lapse; after 9 years, 43% lapse, and after 13 years, 63% lapse.160   
¶54 The reason so many patents are simply never used is that only a small subset of 
patents are “intrinsically more valuable” than the rest.161  Professor Allison and his 
coauthors attempted to distinguish characteristics of valuable patents by comparing 
litigated patents to non-litigated patents.  Valuable patents are defined as those “that 
produce substantial economic benefit to their owners.”162  The authors defend the 
assumption that litigated patents are valuable patents by pointing to the enormous costs of 
patent litigation.163  The authors find the relationship between litigation and value in 
patents to be “quite strong and bidirectional.”164  Thus, while not every valuable patent is 
litigated, it is a fair presumption that a litigated patent is valuable, and therefore that 
litigation is a good proxy for valuable patents.165   
¶55 Thus, the scholarly criticism of the presumption of market power in patent tying 
cases may have been overstated.  Even after Illinois Tool, the fact that a potentially 
valuable patent covers a tying product can be used as evidence to show market power.  
Patents generally do not confer market power; but litigated patents generally are 
extremely valuable, and that value is obtained from the owner’s ability to charge supra-
competitive prices.  Thus, a plaintiff’s first step in determining whether a defendant has 
market power in a patented tying product should be to go to the patent itself.  A thorough 
investigation would include determining the scope of the claims – how broad are the 
claims, how many claims are included; the state of the analogous art; whether the patent 
has been the subject of litigation.  If, for example, the patent includes a large number of 
claims, many of which are broad in scope, and has been the subject of multiple patent 
infringement suits, then it is a good bet that the patent covering the product confers 
market power on its owner. 
C. Patents involved in tying arrangements that foster price discrimination or 
“metering”: price discrimination as a proxy for market power 
¶56  Nearly 100 years ago, in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., the Supreme Court was faced 
with a tying arrangement that required the purchaser of a mimeograph machine to 
 
158 Lemley, supra note 142, at 1507. 
159 Id. at 1501. 
160 Id. at 1504.   
161 John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 437 (2004). 
162 Id. at 440. 
163 Id. at 441. 
164 Id. at 439. 
165 Id. at 440.  The authors recognize the criticism that litigated patents are likely merely a subset of 
valuable patents.  Id. at 443.  That criticism, however, is irrelevant here, because even if litigated patents 
are merely a subset of valuable patents, the critical point is that litigated patents are valuable.  
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purchase all future ink from the producer.166  The economic ramifications and the 
competitive effects of that tie continue to divide economists and lawyers today, even after 
Illinois Tool – the Supreme Court’s latest word on a printer/ink tying arrangement.  There 
are, however, some arguments against the type of tying arrangement employed by Trident 
that, while rejected by the Supreme Court in favor of eliminating the presumption that 
patents confer market power, may still be employed in future antitrust cases to bolster a 
showing that the defendant has market power in the tying product.   
¶57 Courts continue to struggle to identify the competitive effects of tying 
arrangements; scholars continue to disagree on the underlying economic rationales.  What 
does seem clear is that there really is no “one size fits all” economic explanation for tying 
arrangements.167  The two primary economic rationales behind tying theory are the 
leverage theory and the price discrimination theory.168  The leverage theory posits that a 
firm can leverage its monopoly from one product market to another, therefore achieving a 
second monopoly.169  The “Chicago School” discredits this theory in nearly all 
circumstances as impractical and improbable.170  The idea is that there can be only one 
monopoly profit, and that any attempt to extend or “leverage” that monopoly into another 
market will be futile.171  Though this is a hotly debated topic, it appears that neither 
explanation is universal, and that as improbable the leverage explanation may be, there 
are certain circumstances where it could be effective and therefore anticompetitive.172  
Thus, a more dynamic view of the tying and tied markets will focus on whether the tie 
creates barriers to entry or tends to force out competition. 
¶58 The Chicago School discredits the anti-competitive leverage theory and advances 
the competitive-neutral or pro-competitive price discrimination theory.  A firm uses a 
tying arrangement to gauge or “meter” a customer’s usage of the tying product through 
sales of the tied product.  The firm can then charge a supra-competitive price on the tied 
product, and offer the tying product at a discount.  This method allows a firm to reap not 
only the one monopoly profit associated with the tying product, but also the consumer 
surplus associated with that product.  Thus, a customer who prints more bar codes uses 
and buys more ink than a customer who prints fewer bar codes.  Moreover, price 
discrimination is not illegal and it may have some efficiency qualities.  Therefore, 
according to the Chicago School, tying is almost never anti-competitive, and can in many 
cases be pro-competitive.  While the price discrimination theory is attractive in many 
tying cases, it cannot explain every tying arrangement.  For example, the arrangement in 
Loew’s, where blockbuster films were offered only with less popular films, was not a 
price discriminating arrangement.173   
 
166 224 U.S. 1 (1912). 
167 Christopher R. Leslie, Cutting Through Tying Theory with Occam’s Razor: A Simple Explanation of 
Tying Arrangements, 78 TUL. L. REV. 727, 730 (2004).  
168 Id. at 727.  Leslie not only has an interesting discussion of the different tying theories, but also posits a 
much simpler “volume” tying theory.  Id.  Other theories include a “quality control” theory, where tying is 
preferred over standards setting, since there are no policing costs associated with a tying requirement.  See, 
e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes Benz of North America, Inc., 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987).   
169 Leslie, supra note 167, at 732. 
170 Id. 
171 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 32 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
172 Leslie, supra note 167, at 736. 
173 United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). 
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¶59 Professors Nalebuff, Ayres, and Sullivan, in an amicus brief in support of 
Independent Ink, argue that 1) price discrimination can lead to anti-competitive 
distortions and social waste, and that 2) a firm’s ability to price discriminate is evidence 
of market power.174  Surely the first contention offers strong evidence that tying 
arrangements that foster price discrimination should be viewed with caution.175  But it is 
the professors’ second contention that goes directly to the question presented in Illinois 
Tool.  The idea is that it is impossible to price discriminate in a perfectly competitive 
market because consumers know when they are being subjected to price discrimination 
and presumably don’t want to be.176  Thus, consumers will go to a competitor who is 
willing to offer the same product but won’t price discriminate.177  Thus, only when a firm 
has market power defined as an influence over prices and quantity, can a firm subject its 
customers to price discrimination.178  Price discrimination is therefore a proxy for market 
power.179  Trident’s requirement that its customers who lease their patented printhead 
technology also buy all ink from Trident is a clear example of price discrimination.180  
Trident also charged a premium price for its ink, giving more weight to the conclusion 
that Trident was price discriminating.   
¶60 These so called “requirements ties” – ties that foster price discrimination by tying 
future purchases of the complementary tied product to the purchase of the primary tying 
product - should be viewed with caution.181  Where a patent is involved in a requirements 
tie, there is a strong possibility that the seller engaging in the price discrimination 
possesses market power, and that the patent covering the tying product is so valuable as 
to confer market power on the seller.  Thus, although the Supreme Court rejected this 
argument in Illinois Tool, it did not reject the underlying premise that price 
discrimination can be used as a proxy for market power.  Thus, the plaintiff in an antitrust 
tying suit who is charged to show market power may be able to utilize this argument in 
its effort to show that the seller has market power.   
V. CONCLUSION 
¶61  Illinois Tool rejected the presumption that patents confer market power and 
thereby shifted the burden of proving market power to the antitrust plaintiff.  But the 
existence of a patent covering a tying product in a tying arrangement may still be highly 
 
174 Brief of Professors Nalebuff et al., supra note 126. 
175 In addition, because direct price discrimination is possible, for example by charging a per copy price for 





180 Price discrimination is defined as charging different prices to consumers based on their willingness to 
pay.  Trident’s arrangement allowed them to engage in price discrimination.  Trident was able to charge 
customers willing to pay more for their technology an inflated price: the cost of the printhead technology 
plus the cost of ink per use.  Firms using more ink paid more for the technology than firms using less ink.  
The fact that Trident charged a premium for the ink they sold bolsters the conclusion that Trident was 
extracting payment for their patented technology through their ink sales. 
181 See Brief of Professors Nalebuff et al., supra note 126, at 5-6 (“There are two salient features of a 
requirements tie.  First, the two products are essential complements in that the original product is of no 
value without the tied product . . .  Second, the value of the original product is related to its intensity of 
use.”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 7  
 
 384
relevant to plaintiff’s proof of market power.  First, challengers to a tying arrangement 
should determine whether the tying product is covered by a patent, and if so, whether the 
patent is one of a small subset of inherently valuable patents.  Next, the challenger should 
identify whether a tying arrangement is the sort of requirements tie that allows the seller 
to engage in price discrimination.  This price discrimination may itself be a proxy for 
market power.  Illinois Tool, therefore, may have destroyed the presumption that patents 
confer market power, but it did not deny completely the fact that patents are an important 
consideration in determining whether a seller possesses market power. 
